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Doing Things With Natures: 
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ABSTRACT
The article expands on Lewis and Maslin’s “double two-step” historicization of 
the Anthropocene, with two major transitions in energy (agriculture and fossil 
fuels) and two in social organization (modernity and the Great Acceleration). 
Insofar as planetary impacts arise from “what we spend our time doing” – 
foraging, farming, feudal then waged labour, finally unsustainable consumption 
– such “doing” is understood as precisely ‘performative’ in the sense that 
its effects only arise from a massive social repetition that is confused with 
essential nature and thus concealed. Through a graphic model of such ‘plural 
performativity,’ four consecutive Anthropo(s)cenes are sketched: the Giving 
World of agriculture and state formation; the New World of colonial pillage and 
world trade; the Netherworld of wage labour and fossil capital; then ‘All the 
World’ but not with all of ‘us’ as players. Apart from environmental changes, 
the paper targets performances of power and inequality: normative histories 
of ‘common sense’ on the one hand, concealing ‘people’s histories’ of conflict 
and opposition, on the other – the Anthropocene arising not simply from what 
the majority of people have been doing, but from what they have always been 
forced to do.
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In their commendable 2018 overview The Human Planet: How We Created 
the Anthropocene, geographer Simon Lewis and climatologist Mark Maslin 
historicize this issue’s epoch of concern through a “developmental double 
two-step” of cumulative human impact, with two major transitions in energy 
use (agriculture and fossil fuels) and two in social organization (what they 
call Globalization 1.0 and 2.0: the ‘modern world’ and the post-World 
War Two ‘Great Acceleration’). This leaves them with “five broad types of 
human society that have spread worldwide,” as outlined in Figure 1, each 
distinguished from the other by global increases in energy use, available 
information, and “collective human agency.”1 While Lewis and Maslin 
theorize their generic “modes of living” as ‘stable states,’ in the language 
of complex adaptive systems, an important point of theirs is that planetary 
impacts ultimately arise from what “most people spend a significant amount 
of their time doing”: foraging, farming, feudal then waged labour, then all of 
the above plus unsustainable consumption.2 
1  As the authors repeatedly insist, where we place the emphasis has political consequences. 
Focus only on the atmosphere, and we effectively reduce the Anthropocene to climate change, 
obscuring its deeper causalities; peg it to the earliest conceivable impacts, and we “normalize 
environmental change” as “part of the human condition,” evading action against fossil capitalism 
(Lewis and Maslin 2018, 7–8, 281–2). While I identify proponents of the different versions, the 
scope of this article is more with the social, rather than the natural-science side of what has now 
become a veritable Anthropocene industry.
2  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 10–14, 333–4. The authors do admit cultural variability but note that 
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Figure 1. “The becoming of Anthropocene over Lewis and Maslin’s ‘modes of living’.”
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In this article, I define such doing as precisely ‘performative,’ in the sense 
that its effects only arise from a massive social repetition that is confused with 
essential nature and thus concealed: you do something, and it begins to look 
like some thing. To present this dynamic at one glance, in Figure 2 the doing 
is illustrated by the drawing of a circle, the thing by the static boundary that 
ensues; the ‘inversion’ of one to the other is a dual function of production and 
dissimulation. Superficially, all four aspects are derived from the critical gender 
theorist Judith Butler. In her terms the doing and the done reflect practices of 
reiteration (in some social context) and normativity (with its excluded outside), 
with the latter constituted by, but also concealing its basis in the former.3 While 
I can hardly touch on the figure’s nuances, and will only return to it at the 
very end, I intend it as a quick graphic heuristic, with a set of simple terms 
and variables, for framing and grasping complex issues in need of recognition. 
Specifically, the article will highlight the denied dependency of the naturalized 
‘done’ on its ongoing ‘doing,’ so as to complicate any euphemistic derivations 
of the Anthropocene from some unspecified, apolitical ‘human agency.’ 
In the sketches that follow, accordingly, four consecutive ‘worlds’ are performed 
both up close and through some of their consequences, zooming in and out 
between context and containment, doing and done, repetition and normativity. 
I call them the Giving World of agriculture and state formation; the New World 
of colonial pillage and world trade; the Netherworld of wage labour and fossil 
capital; then All the World but not with all of ‘us’ as players. On the one hand, 
“stable states tend to last”: despite otherwise disruptive changes, “the farmers remain farmers” 
(335–6).
3  As for the abstraction of one to the other, the notion of inversion is Tim Ingold’s – “turning the 
world in on itself so that its lines and movements of growth become boundaries of containment” 
(see Paavolainen 2018a, 211, 24–8) – but bears affinity with the Marxian concept of fetishism too: 
people create something, then act as if that thing has power over them. See also Butler 1993, e.g. 
12–13, 234.
Figure 2. Plural Performativity: Historical Process as the Doing of Things.
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even as these can be understood as so many ‘inciting incidents’ for the potential 
emergence of the Anthropocene (the rising arc of Figure 1), each scene is a 
major turning point in environmental relationships as such: both in the practices 
that are massively repeated and in the norms of ‘society’ and ‘nature’ thus 
entrenched (read these in terms of Figure 2). In a generally Marxian vein, what 
counts as ‘nature’ for any human community is understood as largely produced 
by its previous generations’ labour, which again is understood as both naturalized 
and dissimulated by its continued social reiteration. If such doing corresponds 
with the cycle of repetition in the general graph of plural performativity (Figure 
2), the second cycle of inversion (production/dissimulation) is about processes 
of normalization on the scale of generations – most usually dozens of them.
On the other hand, my overall approach in this article is that of a caricaturist 
not a historian. To give my four (Anthropo)scenes a veneer of affective reality, 
each is outlined through a fairly specific set of verbs and nouns, again reflecting 
the performative cycle and circle of Figure 2: verbs for the repeated practices 
specific to each, nouns for how those practices and their attendant ‘natures’ 
would have been named and valorised. In such terms, with the anthropologist 
David Graeber and the Marxist sociologist John Holloway, the cycle is one of 
social doing – constitution, community, bringing together – whilst the circle 
denotes static being: existence, identity, fragmentation, utterly dependent but 
also denying its dependence on such doing.4 Pertinent to their positioning 
in Figure 2, Graeber might go as far as to relate the cycle and the circle to 
the ‘political ontologies’ of the Left and the Right, “bringing things into being” 
through imagination or violence respectively (creativity, care, reproduction / 
possession, destruction, consumption).5 For both artists and revolutionaries, as 
he notes, the world is thus “something that we make, and could just as easily 
make differently”; for Holloway, “the latent is the crisis of the apparent, the verb 
the crisis of the noun.”6
And here, in brief, is the rationale for applying this model of plural performativity 
to the twin crises of global capitalism and environmental breakdown. Rather than 
naturalizing either away as a function of ‘our’ just ‘being human’ (the essentialist 
excuse) or as determined by nonhuman actants beyond any human control 
(what might be dubbed the posthuman excuse),7 they only appear ‘natural’ to 
4  Esp. Holloway 2002. Such binaries pervade both authors’ work to a point of possible annoyance, 
but I choose to delight in their poetics: taken as non-exclusive simplifications, structural dualities 
do schematize complex material in what I would consider a ‘theatrically’ synoptic way (Paavolainen 
2018a).
5  Graeber 2011b, 42ff.
6  Graeber 2011b, 47; Holloway 2019, 275.
7  Daring to dispute the posthuman norm (shades of Jon McKenzie) of contemporary theatre 
and performance studies, it might be argued that while posthuman and new materialist thought 
has done much to undo the destructive baggage of liberal humanism – male, white, European, 
able-bodied – it runs a converse risk of drowning the baby in the now-determinant bathwater. 
Taking seriously Andreas Malm’s (2018a) and Alf Hornborg’s (2019) strong critiques, distributing 
’agency’ from ‘society’ to ‘nature’ now is tantamount to giving it away: as the concomitant sense of 
responsibility – e.g. for the climate catastrophe – is externalized to the carbon cycle itself, politics 
is reduced to mere passive adaptation, “the homogenising bulldozer of capital” (Malm 2018a, 
218–19) entirely unperturbed. While increasingly intertwined in empirical reality, the analytical 
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the extent that their social performance is dissimulated, and may just remain 
humanly changeable as well. So first of all, a performative Anthropocene is 
neither environmentally nor – least of all – apocalyptically determined; to study 
its variables is to try and tease out the doneness of the seemingly given or 
abiding. Second, however, this doing is most certainly socially stratified. Much 
of what the article contributes to Lewis and Maslin’s storyline is drawn from 
social scientists to the left of the spectrum, such as James C. Scott, David 
Graeber, Silvia Federici, Jason Hickel, or Andreas Malm. Apart from complicating 
apolitical notions of ‘human’ agency (L&M would not disagree), this work serves 
to complicate the Butlerian notion of performativity itself. As Federici argues, her 
concept helps denaturalize femininity – or here nature – but may also “flatten 
the content of social action”: “suggesting that the only alternatives open to us 
are consent or dissent,” we “underestimate the rebellion brewing in many acts 
of consent.”8
Where Lewis and Maslin, in The Human Planet, outline global changes in the 
Earth system in a ‘mode of living’ terminology ultimately based on energy use,9 
it should thus be clear that I, here, will target concomitant changes in local and 
global inequalities based on historically accruing structures of power.10 This, I 
argue, is the level where all the various Anthropocene narratives still continue 
to matter. Even if the limits of Earth’s ‘natural variability’ were only reached in 
the most recent stage – the epoch proper as a function of the post-1950s stage 
of globalized capitalism – the natural and the social have been interwoven from 
the start. In the summary Figure 3 at the end of this article, the right-hand circle 
represents official histories of ‘common sense’ and direct action, concealing the 
more systemic ‘people’s histories’ of conflict and opposition, in the left-hand 
cycle – the Anthropocene arising not simply from what the majority of people 
have been doing, but from what they have always been forced to do.11 
Altogether, while the following sections are dramatized through their arguably 
plural performativity at the cost of much historical detail and variability, I do 
believe keeping the storylines just so blunt and ‘left’ serves to make complex 
histories rather more digestible. Expanding on Lewis and Maslin, farming 
coincides with projects of coercion and accumulation by the early states, the 
‘first globalization’ with further enclosures of land and labour, their total control 
with the emergence of fossil capital. All extending to the present, these histories 
distinction between society and nature – “what people create through and through and what is 
not their doing” (Malm 2018a, 75) – is crucial to the prospect of our doing much of anything in 
the warming world. In refusing human agency, in short, posthuman theory risks defusing political 
performativity altogether (cf. Hornborg 2019, 193–207).
8  Federici 2020, 47.
9  See Lewis and Maslin 2018, 442n1.
10  As Andreas Malm has noted (2016, 17–19), the English double meaning of ‘power,’ as 
both social and thermodynamic, may not be altogether accidental insofar as different historical 
parties’ social power over their peers tends to increase quite in line with their control over their 
environments. In a more recent article (2018b, 179), Malm draws on the anthropologist Richard 
Newbold Adams to much the same effect: as he cites Adams (1975, 13) citing C. S. Lewis in an 
epigraph, “Man’s power over Nature … turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other 
men with Nature as its instrument.”
11  On George Lakoff’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘systemic’ action, see Paavolainen 2018b.
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will leave behind no ‘human’ planet but one of chicken bones and plastic, under 
business as usual. 
Even as the rest of the article may well be read as a quick thumbnail survey 
of ground well trodden, I hope to have now sensitized the reader to the generic 
dramaturgy I suggest, synoptically outlined in Figure 2. Thus each of the proposed 
worlds only comes about through the naturalization of certain kinds of humanity 
to the exclusion of certain notions of nature (Normativity and its constitutive 
Outsides); whether framed as essence or efficiency, such containment reliably 
depends on and so also needs to conceal extended histories of practice and 
coercion (Doing and its Contexts). So first, this is no environmentally-determined 
spectacle of Nature being Natural, but an unequally distributed human 
performance of slow violence.12 Second, to address such violence we need to 
consider forms of power and agency that are not only positively dispersed in 
either the Foucauldian or the posthuman sense, but which operate, quite old-
fashionedly, top-down.
Giving World: Agriculture and State Formation
While definitively a ‘Holocene’ phenomenon, geologically, some of the earliest 
stirrings of a humanly performed nature may be dated to some ten thousand 
years ago, when agriculture was developing in many different spots the world 
over, classically in the Fertile Crescent of the Mesopotamian alluvium. To be sure, 
it is only a few hundred generations ago that some human communities took to 
farming the land and tending livestock. After mere millennia of deforestation 
and increasing irrigation, global concentrations of CO2 and methane then began 
to rise, some 8 and 5,000 years ago respectively – just enough to delay an 
impending ice age and to stabilize the Holocene climate sufficiently for large-
scale civilizations to develop. This is the ‘early anthropogenic hypothesis’ 
controversially claimed by palaeoclimatologist William Ruddiman. Affecting 
“more than a third of Earth’s land surface” today, agriculture is clearly no neutral 
mode of pastoral ‘nature’ but “the largest [human] alteration of Earth’s surface 
… yet achieved.”13 For Lewis and Maslin, farming initiates “the first energy 
revolution,” only to be surpassed by the recent discovery of fossil fuels.14
Here, I take my cue on this history of ‘domestications’ from anthropologist 
James C. Scott’s 2017 study Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest 
States. Understood as “control over reproduction,” the term domestication here 
applies not only to plants and animals “but also to slaves, state subjects, and 
women in the patriarchal family.”15 If his somewhat anarchist reading could 
be summarized in a sentence, it might be that farming turned out bad for the 
people but good for the early states. Even if his focus lay “almost entirely 
on Mesopotamia,” sedentism and domestications appear in the region a 
“breathtaking” four millennia before “anything like a state” does.16 Here, this 
12  Cf. Nixon 2011.
13  Ruddiman 2005, 63. See also Lewis and Maslin 2018, 138–46.
14  Lewis and Maslin 2018, Chapter 4.
15  Scott 2017, xii–xiii.
16  Scott 2017, xiii, 58, 116.
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puzzle betokens the key performative tension of repetition and normativity. 
While the agrarian kingdoms would of course “distinguish themselves as sharply 
as possible from the populations from which they sprang,” early sedentism is 
pioneered by “opportunistic generalists with a large portfolio of subsistence 
options,” which only gradually centre around what Scott calls the domus, or 
farmstead, and the state – so slowly that in the end “nobody remembered that 
they had ever lived differently.”17 
On one level, the story of domestications is one of radical concentration. Of 
the swarms of species foraged by foragers, only a select few were ever fit for 
herding or farming, such as goats, sheep, pigs, cattle, and wheat in Mesopotamia 
– all in all, “the full ‘Neolithic package’” would have been “in place” by 6,000 
BCE.18 On the other hand, “the very word ‘agriculture’ suggests a radically new 
process where the wild field (ager) is … turned into a human construct”: a home 
“as a domain separate from wilderness.”19 From the Latin ‘house,’ the domus 
provided a novel “module of evolution” not only for grains and livestock and 
their parasites, but for people themselves: newly dependent on a mere handful 
of plants and animals, they were effectively domesticated by the sheer amount 
of work that their new mode of production demanded.20 In popular historian 
Yuval Noah Harari’s recap, the agricultural revolution was not only a “trap” but 
“history’s biggest fraud,” whereby “the average farmer worked harder than the 
average forager, and got a worse diet in return.” Apart from peasants “dying by 
the thousands and millions” from failed harvests and epidemic diseases, they 
wore down their spines, necks, and knees for a reduced cereal diet that was 
“poor in minerals and vitamins, hard to digest, and really bad for your teeth and 
gums.”21
Then what was it good for, apart from boosting the sheer replication of human 
DNA? The key to Scott’s very argument is that cereal grains were ideal for 
state making, being “visible, divisible, assessable, storable, transportable, and 
‘rationable,’” thus supremely “legible.”22 Indeed, that virtually all the earliest 
agrarian states were based on grain rather than other kinds of crops23 – 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus Valley, Yellow River – makes a good deal of sense 
once you assume the perspective of the tax collector. Providing determinate 
harvests, above ground and predictably simultaneously, “wheat, barley, 
rice, millet, and maize [become] the premier political crops,” with “enormous 
17  Scott 2017, 7, 59; Harari 2015, 98 (“nobody”).
18  Scott 2017, 44.
19  Lent 2017, 109, 105. With the megafauna extinct and nature’s “easy pickings” picked, in Lent’s 
terms, the “giving environment” of the foragers thus becomes a world of limitations and anxiety, 
where “nature now provides food only in return for the right conduct” (99, 112). As all the major 
religions arise soon after, perhaps to alleviate the new levels of injustice, this performative relation 
is then extended through the mediation and manipulation of priests and gods (Lent 2017, 112, 
114).
20  Scott 2017, 73 (“module”); Harari 2015, 90–1. See also Pollan 2001.
21  Harari 2015, 90–94.
22  Scott 2017, 129. On the notion of legibility, cf. Scott 1998.
23  As Scott notes, “history records no cassava states, no sago, yam, taro, plantain, breadfruit, or 
sweet potato states,” adding that “‘banana republics’ don’t qualify” (2017, 21).
Nordic Theatre Studies
13
administrative advantages” for the efficient performance of appropriation.24 On 
the one hand, the embryonic states only needed to harness or “parasitize” an 
“agro-economic module” of grain and manpower already in place, on the other 
they would have to both keep it there and make it produce a surplus.25 Apart 
from grains, hence, they also depended on walls and writing, the very distinction 
of which assumes one between unfree labour and nonproducing elites – great 
city walls erected not only for the sake of protection, but also, simply, to keep 
the taxpayers inside.26 
For no more than their constituent farms were the early states remotely self-
sufficient; we come to the ‘constitutive outside’ of the state container. Much like 
the discourse of binary gender evokes an abject sphere of queer sexuality, the 
allegedly “essential, permanent, and superior” domain of civilization was ever 
dependent on vast populations of undomesticated “nongrain” peoples, inhabiting 
any geographies unsuitable for intensive farming and hence state making: hill 
peoples, forest peoples, swamp dwellers – or in Scott’s “ironic shorthand,” 
barbarians.27 Spread across several food webs, both their ecologies and their 
subsistence practices defied taxation in their mobility, diversity, illegibility. In 
performative terms as well – Lewis and Maslin: “what the majority of humanity 
did, day in, day out”28 – foraging activity is quite as varied as are its settings. By 
contrast, agriculturalists are strapped to a back-breaking “round of ploughing, 
planting, weeding, reaping, threshing, grinding,” their daily and annual routines 
geared to the exacting tempo of their one chosen food web – a ‘civilizing process’ 
that Scott is tempted to see as a deskilling contraction of focus: of their “practical 
knowledge of the natural world,” of their diet, space, and ritual life.29 Evading 
essentialist distinctions between foraging and farming as separate stages in 
a story of human progress, however, all such performances of subsistence 
are situated “along a vast continuum of human rearrangements of the natural 
world.” There is no “fateful line” that separates savagery from civilization, nature 
from culture.30
Thus the normative boundary between domus and wilderness, or state and 
barbarians, is only performed over time by divisions of power and population. 
As Harari reflects on their provision, “history is something that very few people 
have been doing while everyone else was ploughing fields and carrying water 
buckets.”31 As he adds, however, most of the world would have remained “too 
cold, too hot, too dry, too wet, or otherwise unsuited for cultivation”: as late as 
1400 CE, a “minuscule 2 per cent of the earth’s surface constituted the stage 
on which history unfolded.”32 Outside that stage, James C. Scott would hasten 
to add, a good third of the globe was occupied by dispersed bands of hunter-
24  Scott 2017, 130–3. 
25  Scott 2017, 117, 23, 151–2.
26  Scott 2017, 29–30, 137–49. 
27  Scott 2017, 32–3, 219–22, 227–8; cited 249 (“essential”), 222 (“ironic”).
28  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 149.
29  Scott 2017, 19, 88–92.
30  Scott 2017, 8, 61–2, cited 71, 68.
31  Harari 2015, 114.
32  Harari 2015, 111.
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gatherers, pastoralists, and shifting cultivators, most of whom had never met a 
routine tax collector. Overall, he argues this “golden age of barbarians” ought to 
be “measured not in centuries but in millennia.” Beginning as “a mere smudge on 
the map of the ancient world,” statehood was but a “wobbly variable” of human 
life for thousands of years, hegemonic no earlier than about 1600 CE.33 It is from 
around that time that the next two sections trace more modern developments of 
the Anthropo(s)cene, on the American and the European continents respectively.
New World: Colonial Pillage and World Trade
For Lewis and Maslin themselves, the true beginning of “the human epoch” 
and “the decisive change” in human-environment relationships comes with the 
organizational transition “from an agricultural to a profit-driven mode of living” 
– what many prefer to call a ‘Capitalocene’ taking root over the long sixteenth 
century.34 Whatever the terminology, this periodization does lay bare a “deeply 
uncomfortable” backstory of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism as “intrinsically 
linked to long-term planetary environmental change.”35 Insofar as this is also 
the beginning of a newly global economy and ecology, my choice of tracing its 
first four centuries on separate sides of the Atlantic is relatively violent itself, 
yet I hope to prove it justified by the deeply ironic performances of expansion 
and liberation teased out in this and the following section respectively. In the 
more euphemistic language of ‘Great Explorations’ or the ‘Age of Discovery,’ the 
present one begins with a century’s worth of famed European vessels – from 
Columbus’s fleet, utterly lost in 1492, to the British Mayflower of 1620 – reaching 
a range of newly Edenic shores still inhabited by a bunch of barbarians.
In the Anthropocene narrative, however, it is the “many species just hitching 
a ride”36 that prove far more interesting than the heroic mariners of standard 
histories. Conquest wise, the most important would have been the many Old-
World germs and pathogens to which the natives had no immunity whatsoever. 
Helped by brutal human violence, the likes of smallpox, measles, and influenza 
decimated up to 60 million, amounting to some 95 per cent of Indigenous peoples 
and perhaps 10 per cent of all humanity, in just over sixty years.37 Climate wise, 
Lewis and Maslin’s grand thesis is that this demographic collapse also initiated 
a century of global cooling, thanks to the quick reforestation of agricultural land 
across the continent – the very reverse of the initial effects of farming, suggested 
in the previous section, and quite in line with today’s schemes for combatting 
33  Scott 2017, 14, 16, 253.
34  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 13. While sympathetic with the idea of Capitalocene, usually linked to 
the work of Jason W. Moore, they find it wanting as an epochal marker since “the Anthropocene 
will last so far into the future … that it may well encompass other future modes of living” (2018, 
444n21). In the other direction, the epithet does however defy overly Eurocentric accounts that 
tend to obscure the histories of exploitation paving the way for industrialization (Bonneuil and 
Fressoz 2016, 228–9). Following Immanuel Wallerstein, the ‘long’ sixteenth century extends from 
approximately 1450 to 1640.
35  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 326–7.
36  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 10.
37  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 156–8.
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climate change by massive tree-planting.38 Anthropocene wise, however, the 
most geologically significant effect of this ‘Columbian Exchange’ of species 
would have been their sheer homogenization, leaving notions of ‘natural habitat’ 
obsolete and the fossil record itself shaken across continents: suddenly, there is 
cattle and wheat in the Americas, potatoes and tomatoes in Europe.39 As global 
circuits of trade start “threading together” the continents and ocean basins after 
200 million years of separate evolution, standard notions of containment are all 
but frustrated.40
And this is the great irony I highlight in this section. At the same time as 
this novel ‘Age of Sameness’ is instituted – a Homogenocene of species and 
commodities – the grand narrative of expansion and exploration still capitalizes 
on cultural difference. If the idea of biotic or commercial exchange assumes 
cyclical flows of money or migration in some generalized equivalence, then the 
project of expansion is all about denying any such dependencies, promoting 
ideals of civilizational superiority instead. Indeed, this could be taken as the 
grand inversion of an emergent capitalism: as the primary goal of surplus 
production shifts from direct consumption to ongoing accumulation, the spheres 
of performative praxis and normativity are themselves cut apart. In terms of 
Figure 2, the left-hand cycle of social repetition remains very much the motor 
for the right-hand norms of ‘civilization,’ but needs to be actively distanced and 
dissimulated for them to take effect; if there is to be profit and growth, it needs 
to be taken from someplace else. In this case, that place is actively unseen as a 
‘state of nature’ outside the sphere of civilization, hence an object of conversion 
and expansion.
To cut a familiar story extremely short, and prefiguring many later rounds 
of structural adjustment, the normative guideline for the colonial project was 
readily identified with the linear ‘progress’ of a universal humanity, be it of 
the Spanish or the British variety. Yet this universality was itself based on an 
“ontological distinction between … the European Self and Atlantic Other,” the 
latter effectively defined through its lacking from the European norm.41 This 
time around, the main qualifiers of barbarian otherness would have been the 
perceived absence of civilization, reason, and private property. Through such 
attributes, the colonizers were essentially set apart from the untamed passions 
of animal nature, and the plunder of the New World not only legally and 
theologically justified, but translated into a high moral obligation.42 Insofar as the 
Anthropocene is about humanity’s relationships with the natural world, in short, 
the colonial innovation was to figure the relation as one of Conquering Nature 
(as theorized by a Francis Bacon or a René Descartes) while also relegating 
most of living humanity to the other side. In an ironic feat of European inversion, 
peoples who were at least their equals, in living standard, were soon reduced 
38  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 179–87.
39  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 158–61; their Figure 5.1 lists many further examples of “the globalization 
of species” (160). The ‘Columbian Exchange’ was first systematically studied in Crosby 1972.
40  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 162–9.
41  Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 122, 126–7.
42  Lent 2017, 311–12; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 121–73.
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to savage lives that they actively made, in the worn Hobbesian adage, “poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”43 
In terms of what a good number of people would have been doing, I suggest 
no specific verbs this time, but rather the kinds of items they now began to 
shift around – the notion of exchange entailing both the ‘colonial pillage’ and 
the ‘world trade’ of this section’s title. Covering vast swathes of history and 
geography, the extra-American imports alone range from the relatively tacit 
– the pathogens, people, and practices already touched on – to the violently 
explicit. After the decimation of native populations, this means filling the void 
with African slaves and extraneous Europeans (i.e. the poorer peasants to be 
dispossessed in the next section), but later also the Western goods for which 
the colonies provided a captive market, thus enabling Europe’s industrialization. 
Beyond the ‘primitive accumulation’ of land, labour, and capital, conversely, 
New World exports soon centered around imposed monocultures of cash crops 
– produced not for subsistence but for the world market – causing erosion and 
soil exhaustion in the Americas, and new rounds of market dependence on 
both sides. 
And remarkably, this ‘mercantile’ capitalism went global almost as soon as 
it had emerged. In the transatlantic slave trade, as Alf Hornborg likes to put it, 
“American fields, African slaves, [and] British workers” were all “transformed 
into commensurable and interchangeable commodities” through the globalized 
circulation of money that now came to virtually replace solar energy as “the vital 
force flowing through agrarian societies.”44 Insofar as capitalism is ultimately 
about investing money in the expectation of returning a profit, both were there 
virtually from the start. Over the centuries, as Jason Hickel recounts, the colonies 
provided an economic and ecological windfall that veritably “developed Europe,” 
rather than the other way around.45 What Europe provided was a commercial 
credit system that was able to finance its expansion much more efficiently 
than old-style tax collecting, effecting a fundamental inversion of political and 
economic power. Befitting my imagery for performativity, Harari dubs this “the 
magic circle of imperial capitalism: credit financed new discoveries; … colonies 
provided profits; profits … translated into more credit.”46 (Much later in the story, 
part of the magic is how the formerly colonized countries now find themselves 
as the global debtors, still being ‘helped out’ on the ladder of progress.47)
Netherworld: Wage Labour and Fossil Capital
The third transition in Lewis and Maslin’s scheme of Anthropo(s)cenes is another 
energy revolution, surpassing that of agriculture by leaps and bounds. Heralding 
a newly urban species of humans, the Industrial Revolution ostensibly introduced 
new kinds of machines and workspaces in late eighteenth-century England – the 
43  Lent 2017, 277–87; Patel and Moore 2017.
44  Hornborg 2016, 36, 20.
45  Hickel 2018, 71–6, cited 93. This line of argument owes heavily to Frantz Fanon.
46  Harari 2015, 352–6, cited 354.
47  Hickel 2018.
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steam engine and the factory, powered by coal and wage labour respectively.48 
The climatic consequences are incontestable. Eclipsing deforestation as the 
key source of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, “fossilized concentrated sunshine” 
has since “pushed Earth outside the environmental conditions that every human 
culture evolved within.”49 That industrial civilization may boast positive norms 
of ‘growth’ or ‘prosperity’ as if they were its inherent, essential virtues – apart 
from the black performative motor – is, I will argue, a function of its apparent 
‘liberation’ not only from the energetic limitations of wind, water, and muscle, but 
indeed from the very dictates of nature itself.50
And yet, as meticulously documented by Andreas Malm in his magisterial 
Fossil Capital, the primal reason that coal was first adopted in Britain was not 
that it had some neutral edge in cost or performative efficiency, but the fact 
that it gave factory owners superior control over labour, effectively liberating 
them from workers’ demands.51 In the slightly longer performative trajectory 
traced in this section, I suggest that the very precondition for the normative 
‘liberation’ of ‘production’ was that of both land and labour from ‘the commons’ 
to the market – the rhetoric of freedom, here, serving to deny and dissimulate 
an extremely violent process of expulsion and enclosure. De-neutralizing the 
European ‘transition’ from feudalism to capitalism, this backstory entails what 
Marx called the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital, and may conveniently be 
approached as an ongoing performance of multiple separations: that of labour 
and capital (divorcing workers from their very means of subsistence); the 
abstraction of exploitation from a direct personal relationship to one mediated 
by an impersonal market; and ultimately a ‘metabolic rift’ between humans and 
the nature of which they are part, leading to their corresponding alienation and 
disenchantment.52
Starting in sync with Europe’s colonial expansion in the sixteenth century, the 
enclosure of its own territory “changed the relationship between people and the 
environment”53 quite as vitally as the agricultural domus once had – except that 
now its residents were themselves kicked out. As common meadows, forests, 
lakes, and pastures were enclosed for the production of commodity crops 
and especially wool for the international market, the very bases of peasant 
reproduction (grazing animals, gathering wood and berries, hunting, fishing, 
foraging) were translated from customary rights into criminal offences on a 
‘private property’ now administered from a distance.54 In Lewis and Maslin’s 
recap, “the trick was to dispossess people from the land, in order that they then 
worked the same land but needed to pay to lease it.”55 As for those who could 
48  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 209, 192.
49  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 223, 11.
50  See also Salminen and Vadén 2015.
51  Malm 2016.
52  Marx discusses “the so-called primitive accumulation” at the end of Capital Volume I; his 
remarks on the ‘metabolic rift’ in 19th-century industrial agriculture are wonderfully extended in 
Foster 2000.
53  Jones 2017, 117.
54  Jones 2017, 6, 97, 101; Federici 2004, 24, 71.
55  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 343, also 174–5.
Doing Things With Natures
18
not pay rents, their only means of survival was to sell performances of labour to 
those who now ‘owned’ the means of survival of which they had been ‘liberated.’ 
Scientifically, this process entailed a wholesale disciplining of the body. As 
the mechanical philosophy of the time sought not only to fix its work in time 
and space, but to render it predictable and controllable, it might well be argued, 
with Silvia Federici, that “the first machine developed by capitalism” was “not 
the steam engine, and not even the clock,” but the human body converted into 
labour power.56 With strict legislation to homogenize social behaviour, though, 
this “work-machine” could only become a model of conduct by destroying “a vast 
range of pre-capitalist beliefs, practices, and social subjects” that contradicted 
its core norms of discipline and regularity. For Federici, this “state intervention 
against the proletarian body” culminates in the mass execution of hundreds of 
thousands of ‘witches’ over the 16th and 17th centuries.57 Also ‘at stake’ is “the 
constructed character of sexual roles in capitalist society”: boosting differences, 
the witch-hunt performatively “‘produced’ the Woman as a different species” 
– lusty, weak, carnal, insubordinate – a savage exemplum that, having outlived 
its usefulness by the 18th century, was then tamed or inverted to the classic 
bourgeois prototype of domestic femininity (passive, asexual, moral, obedient).58
Well before the burning of fossil fuels, thus, the burning of ‘witches’ helped 
finalize the key inversion of industrial capitalism, and also the long process 
of domestications (which, earlier, James C. Scott defined as “control over 
reproduction”59): in reverse of all subsistence economies, reproduction now 
became fully subordinate to production. For Federici, this history provides an 
important corrective to those that attribute all leaps in productive efficiency 
only to advances in management and specialization. “Just as the Enclosures 
expropriated the peasantry” from the land, so the witch-hunt “liberated” 
women’s bodies “to function as machines for the production of labor.”60 In utterly 
performative terms, what the normative equation of capitalism with ‘free wage 
labour’ serves to hide and naturalize – be it as biological destiny or natural 
vocation – is all the “washing, cuddling, cooking, consoling, sweeping, pleasing, 
cleaning, exciting, mopping, reassuring, dusting, dressing, feeding … and 
caring” that is emphatically required for getting it into the labour market in the 
first place.61
In sum, it is against this background – the control and cheapening of labour 
– that fossil fuels eventually become a necessity for the continued accumulation 
of capital. While the mechanization of the body had reduced the performance 
of work to sheer repetition (decoupled from skill and care, which are restrictive 
and expensive), getting enough of bodies where the water-powered mills lay still 
56  Federici 2004, 146, italics omitted.
57  Federici 2004, 140–1, 144.
58  Federici 2004, 14, 192, 100–3. The assault created deep divisions in the working class: much 
like current discourses of terrorism or indeed immigration, charges of sorcery led many poor “men 
who had been expropriated … to blame their personal misfortunes on the castrating witch” (189–
90).
59  Scott 2017, xii–xiii.
60  Federici 2004, 115, 184, italics omitted.




left considerable leverage to the workers. Hence the factory owners chose to 
invest in coal and steam instead, despite “water being abundant, cheaper and 
at least as powerful, even and efficient” as Malm has documented.62 Likewise, 
as Timothy Mitchell has argued, a key reason why oil would eventually surpass 
coal was that it is far more dependent on capital than on labour, hence immune 
to such disturbances in market freedom as coal miners could still perform (trade 
unions, people’s parties, universal suffrage, social insurance).63 It did need 
massive subsidies, though: “To increase their profit margin,” Mitchell explains, 
oil companies also had to “build the kinds of societies” that would demand their 
products.64 As is now well known, such a world was felicitously performed over 
the twentieth century, as what began with all solids “melting into air” (e.g. as 
carbon dioxide) would spread and solidify in “an immense accumulation of 
commodities.”65
All the World (But Not All of ‘Us’ as Players)
The most recent stage in Lewis and Maslin’s timeline is the second reorganization 
of global society: the ‘Great Acceleration’ of economic activity since the Second 
World War, or in their ‘modes of living’ terminology, the age of consumer 
capitalism.66 In that window, world GDP has increased seven and trade 
elevenfold, while the number of people themselves has trebled, surpassing all 
of previous human history – some 3.4 Earths would be requisite for them all to 
adopt high-end lifestyles (they won’t). Above 400 ppm67 for the first time in three 
million years, three quarters of human-produced carbon dioxide has found its 
way to the atmosphere in this same time frame, causing significant warming not 
only of global climates but of the oceans, loading them with such energy that 
‘once-in-a-century’ hurricanes are now commonplace. 
However, global warming is only one aspect of the Anthropocene condition, 
predominant in current debates given the centrality of energy policy to economic 
growth. Apart from their dramatic decline as carbon reservoirs, the depletion 
of both soils and forests spells a loss of biodiversity potentially amounting to a 
sixth mass extinction. This is hardly compensated by the rising homogeneity of 
what remains: of the world’s mammal biomass, only 3 per cent live in the wild, 
literally outweighed by humans and their domesticated animals, at 30 and 67 
per cent respectively.68 From near nonexistence in 1950, moreover, the world 
62  Malm 2016, 93, italics omitted; Lewis and Maslin 2018, 197–201.
63  Mitchell 2011, 20–1, 36–9, 192–3; see also Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016, 119–20.
64  Mitchell 2011, 193.
65  Citing Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, and the first sentence of Capital Volume I.
66  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 225–65.
67  Parts per million: the standard metric for atmospheric carbon dioxide. Up until the Industrial 
Revolution, the maximum global average was about 280 ppm; while 350 ppm would still count as 
‘safe,’ the current average hovers above 410 ppm, with a record high of 418 ppm measured in May 
2020 (www.co2. earth). Overall, coronvirus restrictions might, however, even cause an 8% fall in 
emissions, which, if repeated every year over a decade, might actually help in limiting warming to 
1.5 C (carbonbrief.org, 19 May 2020).
68  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 4–5, 246. For revealing graphics, see also Damian Carrington, 
“Humans just 0.01% of all life but have destroyed 83% of wild mammals – study,” The Guardian, 
21 May 2018. 
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has been taken over by cars and plastics, such that its entire surface could now 
be wrapped in thin layers of both plastic and concrete.
From the future stratigrapher’s perspective, the sudden appearance of all this 
might indeed signal the beginning of a new epoch, but historically, this is not an 
epoch of a unified anthropos. Premised on the contradiction between normative 
performances of consumption, in the so-called core regions of the economy, and 
their basis in ongoing extraction in its peripheries, this last section of the article 
moves swiftly from the rhetoric of freedom and opening to various realities of 
renewed containment. In performative terms, I hope to at least intuit how the norm 
of consumption is only enabled through a drastic difference between what the 
core minority and the peripheral majority spend their time doing – buying, flying, 
driving, as opposed to what is euphemistically called ‘developing.’ As suggested 
in Figure 3, moreover, all the previous histories that have been outlined seem 
very much present in this current stage: global agriculture, colonial divisions, 
even dirty industry if now outsourced to the global South.
Institutionally, the Great Acceleration has its basis in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War. First, the “state of exception” the war itself performed 
– also in relation to the environment – has since been utterly normalized, 
with “civilian markets designed to absorb the excess industrial capacity” first 
mobilized for war, and the U.S. military remaining the world’s largest consumer 
of petroleum by far.69 Second, the global institutions built after 1945 have 
secured the interests of free markets and economic growth – the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and what is now called the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) – but also of the individual member states of the United 
69  Bonneuil & Fressoz 2016, 122–47, cited p. 129, 145; see also Angus 2017; Graeber 2011a, 
365–7. The Cold War context plays a part too: even if “Soviet communism used the state rather 
than markets to allocate profits,” Lewis and Maslin find it structurally congruent with their “broad 
definition of a capitalist mode of living” – both camps racing to out-industrialize the other (2018, 
442n1, 232).
Figure 3. The layered performances of the Anthropocene: a palimpsestic summary.
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Nations (UN). On the one hand, the liberation of market forces has entailed a 
massive increase in state regulation. After all, it is primarily states that construct, 
maintain, and renew the material infrastructures that mediate the relationship 
between capitalism and nature – and conveniently, both international shipping 
and military emissions are exempted from official accounting in all UN-backed 
climate agreements (the 2015 Paris Accord makes no single reference even 
to fossil fuels).70 On the other hand, latter-day ‘free trade agreements’ enable 
corporations to sue even independent states if they impose such limits on future 
profits as minimum wages or environmental regulations – all for the grand ideal 
of human freedom.71
This, arguably, is the Grand Dissimulation of the Great Acceleration. Under 
the blind ‘post-industrial’ norm of ‘consumer’ capitalism, the brutalities of dirty 
production, enclosure, and primitive accumulation have not disappeared 
anywhere, but have only been displaced “to less affluent sectors of the world-
system.”72 With the very dynamic of capital veritably saved by the World 
Bank and the IMF, multinational corporations may now “establish factories 
in the cheapest places possible with minimal tax obligations and reduced 
environmental and labor regulations,” freely shipping their goods across the 
very borders that so effectively contain workers, wages, and legislation.73 
With the escalating depletion of the global environmental commons for 
palm oil production and high-intensity extraction, “the Great Acceleration 
thus corresponds to a capture by the Western industrial countries of the 
ecological surpluses of the Third World.”74 As the anthropologist Jason 
Hickel recounts with admirable clarity in his brief history of The Divide, the 
global South’s yearly debt service “vastly outstrips the amount that the UN 
tells us is necessary to eradicate poverty entirely,” the global income gap 
having more than quadrupled, from 1960 to 2000, to a ratio of 134 to 1.75 
Hence the violent logic of containment in Figure 3: in Naomi Klein’s 
memorable prose, the global economy is predicated not only on the 
existence of “sacrifice zones – whole subsets of humanity categorized as 
70  Hickel 2018, 218 (regulation); Keucheyan 2016 (mediation); Jones 2017, 153–61 (UN critique).
71  Hickel 2018, 184–219; Jones 2017, 128–32.
72  See e.g. Hornborg 2016, 35, 152, cited p. 156.
73  Hickel 2018, 170–2; Jones 2017, 165–6 (“factories”), 126–7, 132.
74  Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016, 250.
75  Hickel 2018, 177, 16. In David Graeber’s famous summary, “there is no better way to justify 
relations founded on violence, to make such relations seem moral, than by reframing them in 
the language of debt – above all, because it immediately makes it seem that it’s the victim who’s 
doing something wrong” (2011a, 5, but see also p. 2). As for the PR tactic of ‘development,’ 
Hickel’s strong argument is that it served to detach global poverty and inequality from centuries of 
colonialism and make them appear fully internal to the developing countries themselves, be it due 
to “corruption or bad governance or poor institutions” (2018, 2–4, 18–21). In a superbly felicitous 
feat of performative normalization, poor and rich countries were deemed “naturally abundant” in 
labour and capital respectively, their differences inverted to essentialized traits and the historical 
takers into benevolent givers (10, 25). Finally, the “single moral justification” for maintaining such 
an economic order to the present is “the good-news narrative” (61) according to which global 
poverty and inequality are actually in decline – this being a statistical effect of countries like China 
that refused structural adjustment (37–43) – as is Western consumption itself – an effect of offshore 
production being off balance-sheet too (287).
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less than fully human,” but quite as much on the ability of the more privileged 
to cordon them off “as hinterlands, wastelands, nowheres … middle of 
nowheres” – “as if we in the West [were] mere spectators.”76 Far from not 
taking precautions, the climate-change policies of the West are apparent 
in a massive proliferation and militarization of borders and border walls, 
“materializing … denial through a literal concretizing of out of sight out of 
mind.” If the displacement of a mere 14 million sufficed to throw the EU into 
a ‘migration crisis’ in 2014–15, “the UN envisages 50 million environmental 
migrants a year by 2030.”77 
Of the three logical components of this containment structure, the first 
and most material is “the global border regime” itself – one of barbed wire 
and border patrols, drones and identity documents, backed up with “the 
full violence of the state.”78 No “natural divisions,” as Reece Jones argues, 
most political borders are centuries old at best, and exist to “protect the 
economic, political, and cultural privileges that have accrued” over the 
course of history – the distinction between inside and outside, native and 
foreigner being at “the foundation of the state as an institution.”79 The second 
component is the equally ancient trope of barbarian invasion: reduced to 
runaway migration, climate change is again ‘othered’ on the reproductive 
poor. In Andrew Baldwin and Giovanni Bettini’s recap, ‘the climate change 
migrant’ is figured as a “constitutive outside or excess,” a residue of nature 
that robs the poor of their history but has to be managed or contained, lest 
it visit a ‘return of the repressed’ on the rich – “a fear homologous with the 
midnight worries of the slave holder.”80
Finally, the bubble of ‘consumption’ is itself a tight container of aspirations. 
With previously externalized policies of privatization, austerity, and primitive 
accumulation now chipping away at the core regions of global capitalism as 
well, this bubble works to actively repress any alternatives to “the exponential 
growth of the global economy” that Lewis and Maslin themselves recognize 
at the root of the Great Acceleration.81 As the economy is “expected to more 
than double in size every twenty-five years … ever-more dramatic changes 
to society and the Earth system become the norm,” which again “points 
towards either a new configuration of human society or its collapse.”82 The 
76  Klein 2014, 268, 72.
77  Nixon 2011, 20 (“denial”); Jones 2017, 3–4 (EU); Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016, 5 (UN). Apart 
from Trump’s fantasies, Jones recounts, “new border walls were initiated [in 2016 and 2017] in 
Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
[Norway,] Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in Calais, France” (2017, vi).
78  Jones 2017, 48–69, 88.
79  Jones 2017, vii, 117–18, 166–9.
80  Baldwin and Bettini 2017, 3, 15.
81  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 14–15. See also Klein 2014, 93–6, 268–72; Graeber 2011a, 282.
82  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 15. This is at a yearly growth rate of 3 per cent; as Hickel notes, “a 
4.5 per cent rate of growth – which is roughly the aggregate rate that the governments of the world 
want to achieve – doubles a ‘thing’ every sixteen years.” His example is eye-opening: “If Ancient 
Egypt had started with one cubic metre of possessions and grew them by 4.5 per cent per year, 
by the end of its 3,000-year civilisation it would have needed 2.5 billion solar systems to store all 
its stuff.” (2018, 284.)
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likelihood of the latter is suggested by a set of structural ‘lock-ins’ that will be 
extremely hard to undo, whether they be technological (networks of roads 
and gas stations), financial (fossil fuel speculation on ‘proven reserves’), or 
ideological – the performance of countries judged by the standard of gross 
domestic product (GDP), measuring the rate at which they transform nature 
and human activities into money.83 As Hickel explains, ramping up GDP 
“means ramping up production and consumption each year,” multiplying the 
sheer amount of trade, debt, waste, cars, planes, and energy use even if 
the latter were to magically turn 100 per cent ‘clean’ overnight.84 
As worrying new forecasts are announced by the hour – of a world with 
no clouds or insects, a mere sixty harvests left, its fish outweighed by ocean 
plastics – this may well be a bubble of “no refuge,” making ‘the climate 
refugee,’ as Claire Colebrook suggests, “an appropriate way of beginning 
to think about humans in general.”85 In Lewis and Maslin’s collapse-or-
reconfigure scenario, the potential for the latter inheres in their observation 
that their ‘modes of living’ have each been consecutively shorter: after 
300 years of mercantile and only 150 years of industrial capitalism, the 
mathematical 75 years of consumer capitalism might give way to something 
else by 2030.86 As an article like this is bound to evoke the reaction, ‘Then 
what shall we do about it?’, what I hope to argue in further instalments is 
that at least the model of ‘plural performativity’ provides a graphic way of 
assessing the available alternatives. If this paper has concentrated on only 
defamiliarizing a set of problematic norms, the poles of normativity and 
repetition do suggest further performances of regulation and resistance. 
If prospects of regulation are currently compromised by vexed interests, 
throughout history the cycles of ‘doing’ have always comprised much larger 
portions of humanity than those whose power, money, and weaponry uphold 
the problematic norms (Figure 3). The logical alternatives are affirmation 
and negativity: in one sense, we already are ‘ecological’87 and thus fully 
adaptable to a post-carbon world – one might call this a ‘prefigurative 
posthumanism.’ In another sense, to actually get there we will need more 
than an artistic sensitivity to our nonhuman kin; hence the call remains for 
strictly human action against strictly social structures of fossil capital.88
83  Lent 2017, 396–400.
84  Hickel 2018, 282–90.
85  Colebrook 2017.
86  Lewis and Maslin 2018, 358, and their Chapter 11.
87  Morton 2018.
88  Malm 2018a; Hornborg 2019. We will not be returning to 350 ppm of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, but as Extinction Rebellion likes to remind, nonviolent mass movements have been 
invariably successful once they secure the sustained commitment of a mere 3.5 per cent of 
a population (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, for reference; even this is a tall call though, 
meaning e.g. 26 million Europeans).
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